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Democratic constitutions and education  
to freedom
Constituições democráticas e a educação para a liberdade
Alessandro Pinzani*
Hans Sachs
Dem Volke wollt ihr behagen; 
nun dächt’ ich, läg’ es nah, 
ihr ließt es selbst euch auch sagen, 
ob das ihm zur Lust geschah. [...]
Konrad Nachtigall
Wenn spricht das Volk, halt’ich das Maul.
(R. Wagner. Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg, 1st Act)1
Abstract: This essay shall analyze the idea of the possibility of education to freedom 
through democratic institutions and the role of the constitution in this process. The 
question shall not be considered from an empirical perspective, but from a theoretical 
perspective. In the first part democratic institutions will be defined in such a way, that 
it is possible to speak of democratic habit as a necessary component of democracy. 
The second part shall introduce a concept of State constitution that takes seriously 
the hope that such a constitution could be the major tool for the education to freedom 
of citizens. Finally, this paper shall try to make sense of the very idea of democratic 
participation as education to freedom: firstly by identifying the conditions in which 
the latter is possible, and secondly by offering a certain definition of freedom. In this 
context, freedom shall be defined as political autonomy and deliberative power, taking 
distance both from the traditional liberal definition of freedom and from the traditional 
republican one, while accepting partially what is something referred to as the (radical)   
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1   Sachs: You want to please the people; well, I should have thought it in your interest to let them 
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democratic definition of freedom. However, the impact of the latter will be limited by 
referring to what we may call the constitutionalist tradition.
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Resumo: O presente ensaio tenta analisar a idéia da possibilidade de uma educação 
à liberdade por meio de instituições democráticas e o papel da constituição neste 
processo. A questão não será considerada de uma perspectiva empírica, antes de uma 
teórica. Na primeira parte as instituições democráticas serão definidas de maneira que 
seja possível falar dum hábito democrático como de um componente necessária da 
democracia. A segunda parte introduzirá um conceito de constituição estatal que leve 
a sério a esperança de que ela possa ser um importante instrumento para a educação 
dos cidadãos à liberdade. Finalmente, o ensaio tentará dar um sentido à idéia de 
participação democrática como educação à liberdade: primeiramente, ao identificar 
as condições nas quais esta seria possível e, em seguida, ao oferecer uma definição de 
liberdade. Neste contexto, a liberdade será definida como autonomia política e como 
poder deliberativo, tomando assim distância quer da tradicional definição liberal quer 
da tradicional definição republicana, aceitando, ao mesmo tempo, em parte aquela 
que é chamada às vezes de definição (radical-)democrática de liberdade. Contudo, 
o impacto desta aceitação será limitado recorrendo àquela que pode ser chamada de 
tradição constitucionalista.
Palavras-chave: Democracia; Constituição; Participação política; Educação política; Cidadania 
In place of an introduction: Bobbio on democratic institutions 
and habit
In October 1945, shortly after the end of World War II and of the Italian 
“Resistenza” (the bloody guerrilla war against the German occupation army 
and against its collaborationist allies, the fascists of the so called Republic 
of  Salò),  in  an  article  on  “Democratic  Institutions”,  Norberto  Bobbio 
assigned to democracy an end of its own: the education of citizens to freedom 
(“l’educazione dei cittadini alla libertà”): 
Only the free man – Bobbio goes on with Kantian pathos – is 
responsible; but man is not born free, except that in the abstractions 
of the Enlightenment: man becomes free in a social environment, 
in which the economical, political, cultural conditions are such that 
they bring him to become, even despite him, conscious of his own 
worth as human being, and therefore of his own chances and limits 
in the world along the other human beings. To purse this end one 
needs democratic institutions (Bobbio, 1996, p. 29; my transl.).
In the following November, in an article on Democratic institutions and 
habit, Bobbio stresses the important role of a constitution in this process, since 474   Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 9, n. 3, p. 472-495, set.-dez. 2009
it is the democratic constitution of a State that founds the democratic habit of 
the citizenry: 
The constitution will take roots in the habit of the people. And the 
habit will be the best guarantee of the constitution. It is absurd to 
hope that a constitution will last in time, if it is not supported by 
the belief in its conformity to the demands of freedom and justice, 
which a people developed in a certain moment of its history, [if it is 
not supported] by that belief from which a habit arises. Democratic 
institutions and democratic habit support each other: the habit needs 
the institution to arise; the institution needs the habit to last (Bobbio, 
1996, p. 31; my transl.).2
These words echo in a sense the famous Kantian sentence “For it is not 
the case that a good State constitution is to be expected from inner morality; 
on the contrary, the good moral education of a people is to be expected from 
a good State constitution” (Kant, 1996, p. 335f). Like Kant, Bobbio believes 
that good institutions, which he identifies with democratic institutions, will 
bring about the moral education of the people: the democratic habit Bobbio 
refers to in the second article is namely the highest expression of that freedom 
as moral responsibility, which is the object of the first article. A democratic 
constitution creates a democratic habit and therefore it makes men free (and 
morally responsible). Bobbio goes even further than Kant, who never thought 
of the “moral education of a people” as an education of individuals to freedom 
and moral responsibility (Pinzani, 2003).
Bobbio’s words must be read in the context of the historical moment and 
political atmosphere in which they were written: they arose from the debate 
on the reconstruction of democratic life in Italy after twenty years of fascist 
dictatorship. But beyond their historical contingency, they retain an appeal that 
I find fascinating and worthy of deeper consideration. Bobbio’s words both 
touch upon questions that are still open and, at the same time, suggest solutions 
that are still captivating. This essay will therefore analyze Bobbio’s seminal 
idea of the possibility of education to freedom through democratic institutions 
and the role of the constitution in this process.
It  is  not  my  intention  to  consider  this  question  from  an  empirical 
perspective; this is the task of social scientists, and there are in fact works 
on this topic (one of the most celebrated being notably Putnam’s study on   
 
2  Both articles were published in GL, the newspaper of the Partito d’Azione, a small party of 
radical and moderate liberal intellectuals, which had a very short life (on the causes of this 
shortness s. the explanations of Bobbio himself in Bobbio [1996, p. 101 ff]). The letters G and 
L stay for Giustizia e Libertà, which was the name of the partisan organization founded by the 
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Italy, i. e. on the country, on whose democratic future Bobbio was so keen: 
Putnam, 1993). I shall instead approach this theme from a more theoretical 
perspective. 
My first move will be to define, roughly, democratic institutions in such a 
way, that it is possible to speak of democratic habit as a necessary component 
of democracy. This is not tantamount to claiming that this would be the only 
or the “best” definition of such institutions; rather, this definition will show 
that, from the point of view of formal or economical theories of democracy, 
democratic habits are not just a contingent element of democracy itself. The 
second part of the paper will present a concept of State constitution that takes 
seriously Bobbio’s (and Kant’s) hope that such a constitution will be the major 
tool for the education to freedom of citizens.
Finally, this paper shall try to make sense of the very idea of democratic 
participation as education to freedom: firstly by identifying the conditions 
in which the latter is possible, and secondly by offering a certain definition 
of freedom. In this context, I shall present a concept of freedom as political 
autonomy and deliberative power, and in doing so it shall distance itself both 
from the traditional liberal definition of freedom and from the traditional 
republican one, while accepting partially what is something referred to as the 
(radical) democratic definition of freedom. In doing so I will nevertheless limit 
the impact of my acceptance of the (radical) democratic position by referring 
to what we may call the constitutionalist tradition.
I am aware, that this is a very ambitious proposal. In this context I shall 
be content with sketching a possible way of dealing with this topic. A more 
in-depth treatment will take place elsewhere.
Democratic institutions
One could say that there are as many definition of democracy as political 
theories or political thinkers (not even considering the different definitions 
of it that the same thinker may have given at different moments). The most 
generic definition is that of a form of government in which sovereignty belongs 
to the people. Difficulties arise as soon as one asks how this sovereignty is 
exercised. This is a central question, since the differences between, say, 
representative and direct democracy, or between constitutional or moderate 
and  “unrestrained”  democracy  are  not  secondary  ones,  and  since  they 
affect both the concept of popular sovereignty and the means of exercising 
this sovereignty (some contemporary advocates of direct democracy for 
instance  dismiss  representative  democracy  as  not  democratic  at  all:  cf. 476   Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 9, n. 3, p. 472-495, set.-dez. 2009
Barber,  1984).  But  what  do  we  mean,  when  we  speak  of  “democratic” 
institutions?
I shall turn again (and for the last time) to the young Bobbio, who in 
1945 wrote: 
Democratic institutions […] are those institutions, which call the 
largest possible number of citizens to the responsibility of power 
without tying them to it; which – by enlarging suffrage, participation, 
control – prevent the few ones from transforming the State in a 
stronghold of privileges and from claiming for themselves all the 
advantages of power while refusing to assume all its responsibilities 
(Bobbio, 1996, p. 25; my transl.).
And further: 
Democracy means nowadays in the first instance giving the State to 
the citizens, to fill as much as possible the gap between individual 
and State; in a word, it means to bring back the State to the same 
level as men by taking the citizen to the government and to the 
administration – not only in the town halls, but also in the factories, 
in the professions, in the school etc. –, by assigning directly – and 
not only indirectly – to individuals the duties and responsibilities of 
citizens (Bobbio, 1996, p. 29; my transl.).
The language of Bobbio in the quoted passages is worth stressing. He 
insists very much on the responsibilities connected with the fact of being a 
citizen, much more than on the rights which arise from this fact – and this after 
a period in which Italians have had very few rights for such a long time! Yet he 
also insists on the fact that democracy should not be limited to voting, but is also 
bound up with forms of direct exercise of power, and not only in immediately 
political spheres like work and school. He understands therefore democracy 
as democratization, as the extension of democratic forms of decision-making 
and of control to spheres others than the strictly political (i.e. the sphere of 
law-creating institutions such as parliaments etc.). Bobbio evidently advocates 
here a concept of democracy which we can designate as “strong”, if compared 
for instance to Schumpeter’s almost contemporary economical theory of 
democracy (Schumpeter, 1942) or to the formal conception of democracy, 
which Bobbio himself will later develop (Bobbio, 1984).3
This  “strong”  concept  recalls  the  classical  republican  tradition, 
particularly  because  of  its  insistence  on  direct  participation  and  on  the 
political responsibility of all citizens, and because of the warning of the risks   
 
3  I shall not compare here Bobbio’s early conception of democracy with his later one, nor with 
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represented by the concentration of political power in the hands of “the few 
ones”. In the republican tradition however, one can find also a certain mistrust 
directed towards direct popular participation in the decision- and law-making 
processes (James Harrington and John Adams being notably the fiercest 
opponents of such participation, but even Rousseau had at least a certain 
distrust of such populism, which led him to deny the possibility of public 
political debates and to reduce the role of popular assemblies to the approval 
or disapproval of governmental deliberations – on this point s. Manin (1987). 
Republicanism is not necessarily democratic: the kind of democracy or – better 
– of republic desired by most Founding Fathers, for instance, could be seen 
as a kind of “elective aristocracy”, i. e. as a form of government, in which 
the people are called merely to elect their representatives without interfering 
either in the definition of the political agenda, or in the process of decision-
making (Schudson, 1999).4 The latest point is decisive: not every form of 
representation leads necessarily to elective aristocracy, but only the form of 
government, in which (1) the people are called to participate merely in the 
election of representatives and are deprived of any other possibility of political 
participation; (2) the representatives have a commitment exclusively towards 
the nation in its whole and not towards their voters as private citizens. In other 
words, our contemporary democracies are not elective aristocracies in so far 
as they do not satisfy at least one of the previous criteria, for instance through 
the existence of parties (which would suspend partially or completely the 
second condition) or through the existence of forms of participation other than 
the vote, like referenda, popular bills, petitions etc. (which would leave the 
first condition unfulfilled). However, the mere existence of parties as agencies 
that organize, channel and help to realize the interests of individuals is not in 
itself a guarantee of democracy. Parties are also compatible with oligarchy, 
and even with autocracy or despotism (in this case they would simply be 
lobbies, of course, since no free party would be allowed). And when popular 
participation is limited to elections, the people are de facto excluded from the 
decision-making process in favor of parties. Here, the people would devolve 
the sovereignty to parties instead of individuals (as in elective aristocracy), and 
we would have what one could define “partyism” or “partycracy”.
4  Robert A. Dahl distinguishes between two strains of republicanism: a more aristocratic or 
conservative one and a more democratic one. In the aristocratic republican view, the most 
difficult problem is to create a constitutional structure that will restrain the impulses of “the 
many”: “The proper function of the people is not to rule […], but rather to choose leaders”. 
Democratic republicanism fears rather the aristocratic and oligarchic elements and aims to 
create a constitution that will prevent the elite from seizing power (Dahl, 1989, p. 25ff).478   Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 9, n. 3, p. 472-495, set.-dez. 2009
Democracy can therefore be defined roughly as a form of government, in 
which (1) people (i. e. the citizens as a whole) have an influence both on the 
definition of the political agenda and on the process of decision-making, and   
(2) this influence is not limited to casting their ballots at the end of every 
legislature. In this sense the alternative between direct and representative 
democracy is a false one: a real representative democracy (i. e. a form of 
government which is neither an elective aristocracy, nor a mere partycracy) 
does not rule out the possibility that the people intervene directly in the 
decision-making, while at the same time releasing the citizens from the 
burdens connected to what I shall call a pervasive direct democracy (it is 
pervasive since it is not limited to certain forms of participation, but covers 
the whole democratic process, and, since it covers every aspect of law-making, 
it is therefore pervasive both with regard to the institutional mechanism of 
decision-making and to the contents of it, i. e. to the concrete policies).5 
Political participation in a pervasive direct democracy requires from the 
citizens a strong willingness to take concrete responsibility (e. g. as public 
officials) as well as the willingness to invest considerable resources of time, 
information, and interest for, attention to and knowledge of publically relevant 
themes. Such requirements are very difficult to meet, even on small scale. The 
usual examples offered by advocates of direct democracy (Swiss cantons, 
ancient Athens, Italian medieval town-states) are in fact not particularly 
relevant. In terms of direct participation in public offices, it is very difficult 
to see how this could be possible in our complex societies, except for limited 
forms such as jury duty or the like. Secondly, political participation in decision-
making as intended by this vision of pervasive direct democracy was (in past 
times) or is (in the case of Switzerland) always limited to a relatively small 
number of citizens,6 and precisely to those citizens, who were/are interested 
in and had/have the resources for participating. Direct democracy works only 
if citizens (1) have time to devote themselves to politics and (2) have the 
necessary knowledge to take meaningful decisions. Since it is practically 
impossible for these two conditions to be met by all citizens (particularly in 
our highly complex societies), direct democracies tend to become sorts of 
aristocracies in which sovereignty is exercised by those individuals who have 
5  In a pervasive direct democracy, citizens are called – at least theoretically – to take decisions 
on such disparate issues as tax-policies, educations, health-care, financial matters, economical 
development, foreign policies, etc.
6  Not all the Athenians took part in the assembly and even less took the floor; decision-making 
institutions in the Italian comuni were mostly composed by representatives (elected by vote or 
by lot); and also in the many referenda that take place in the Swiss cantons, the percentage of 
voters is quite low.479     A. Pinzani – Democratic constitutions and education to freedom
either the intellectual faculties or the economical resources7 that are necessary 
to take part in a continuous and pervasive decision-making process.8 
If we want that democracy entails a “giving of the State to the citizens”, 
as Bobbio wrote, we cannot therefore realize this ideal by establishing a 
pervasive direct democracy. Instead we must turn to some form of representative 
democracy corrected by mechanisms of direct popular participation in the 
process of decision-making. Representation releases the citizenry from the 
burden of constant participation: they are not required to have the interest, 
time, and material resources necessary to take part in the decision-making 
process. However, the corrective represented by mechanisms of direct popular 
participation allows the citizenry to take back into their hands the concrete 
exercise of sovereignty every time they deem it necessary. The more numerous 
and extensive these mechanisms are, the more the democratic institutions will 
meet the ideal sketched by Bobbio (and similar ideals outlined by many other 
thinkers). This will not prevent the possibility that only a small group of citizens 
take political participation seriously, but, where this is the case, this will be 
the contingent result of circumstances and not the necessary consequence of 
institutional arrangements as in the case of pervasive direct democracy.
By defining democracy as a form of government in which sovereignty 
is concretely exercised by elected representatives, and in which the people 
influence the political agenda and the process of decision-making through 
certain mechanisms, one avoids the need to take a position on the question 
of whether political participation should be conceived in terms of a theory 
of deliberative democracy. In other words, I do not want – for the moment 
and in this context – to specify whether the individual who takes part in the 
democratic process does this from a strategic attitude of an interest-oriented 
actor or from the less egoistical attitude of a member of a community, whose 
aim is to reach a general consent on the common interest, on the common 
good, on a shared way of life etc. (different theorists of deliberative democracy 
give different ends to the participation of individuals in political life).9 My 
reason for avoiding this question is that it is not necessary to find an answer 
to it in order to sustain the claim that democracy implies the existence of a 
democratic habit.
Even if we should consider egoistical private interests as the only motive 
leading citizens to participate politically; even if we should define democracy   
 
7  In Athens, for instance, this was made possible through the existence of slave labor.
8  This aspect leads Arendt to the conclusion that there is no place for real political action in our 
society (Arendt, 1958).
9  A good presentation of this alternative is offered by Elster (1997).480   Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 9, n. 3, p. 472-495, set.-dez. 2009
as a form of the regulation of conflicts among individuals through the search 
for compromises – a search in which every individual attempts to maximize 
her own interests –; even if we should therefore define democracy as a form 
of cooperation, in which all pursue primarily their own individual goals and 
views the democratic process merely as a way of pursuing these goals; even 
in such cases, we should expect that individuals manifest certain attitudes, the 
lack of which would make co-operation impossible. I will develop this point 
by referring to the concept of constitutional consent advanced by John Rawls 
in Political Liberalism.
Constitution and consent
In Political Liberalism, Rawls sketches a two-stage process through 
which an overlapping consensus might arise in a society (Rawls, 1993,   
p. 158ff). The first stage leads from a modus vivendi based on principles of 
justice to a situation of constitutional consent. The modus vivendi is reached 
when individuals or rival groups agree on terms of co-operation that will 
avoid an open conflict for reasons of mutual advantage. This equilibrium is a 
weak one and can be easily broken – namely every time that one of the parties 
thinks itself strong enough to do so and to impose its own will on the others. 
From a strategic point of view, in such scenarios co-operation would not be 
rational for the more powerful (this recalls the argument of the Fools, which 
Hobbes discusses in chapter XV of the Leviathan: s. Hobbes (1996, p. 101ff). 
Rawls’ idea is that, over time, the benefits of co-operation will lead citizens to 
what he calls “constitutional consent”. They will agree on a basic catalogue of 
rights and liberties and respect them on every occasion. Moreover, they will 
necessarily make use of a limited public reason in order to present arguments 
that can be discussed and accepted (or rejected) by everyone. The consequence 
of both elements (the agreement on basic rights and the use of public reason) 
will be the promotion of liberal virtues, namely: “the virtue of reasonableness 
and a sense of fairness, a spirit of compromise and a readiness to meet others 
halfway, all of which are connected with the willingness to cooperate with 
others on political terms that everyone can publicly accept” (Rawls, 1993, 
p. 163). This should lead to the second stage of Rawls’ model, in which an 
overlapping consensus arises.
Rawls claims that the limits of constitutional consent lies in the lack of 
an underlying conception of person and society common to all citizens, and 
in the fact that it does not touch the basic structure of society. Questions such 
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structure are impossible to solve from the mere point of constitutional consent 
(Rawls, 1993, 164f). I agree with Rawls on this point, but note that even at this 
minimal level of consent, it is necessary for individuals to show attitudes that 
are neither commonly found, nor easily developed 
Advocates of economic theories of democracy would deny that this 
is necessarily the case. They would concede that the form of co-operation 
required  by  democratic  institutions  must  be  a  stable  one,  and  therefore 
rather similar to that which in the Rawlsian model is based on constitutional 
consent. If democracy were just a precarious modus vivendi, there would be 
no reason to prefer it to the autocracy of a Hobbesian Leviathan. However, 
economic theories of democracy assume that co-operation could work without 
individuals’ assuming attitudes like those listed by Rawls. 
On this point, these theories may be right. While it is clear that, in order 
to avoid instability, individuals should reach consent on some basic rights and 
on some minimal procedural rules for agreements, it is not easy to see how this 
should lead necessarily to the development of all the attitudes detailed by Rawls. 
What is required – from the point of view of economic theories of democracy 
– is merely the willingness to co-operate with others in a generic way (i. e. 
in a less demanding way than that claimed by Rawls, which is connected to 
public acceptance by everyone of the political terms of cooperation itself),10 
the acknowledgment of the existence of different interests, and the necessity of 
articulating one’s own interests in such a way that others can understand them 
and take them into account. These are neither “liberal virtues”, nor elements 
of a democratic habit. The idea that a constitutional consensus on basic rights 
and on a limited use of public reason will lead to the development of liberal 
virtues is therefore a non sequitur. 
In  order  to  overcome  this  difficulty,  I  suggest  that  we  (1)  define 
constitutional consent (as the next stage following the precarious modus 
vivendi of unstable cooperation) in a different way to Rawls: in a way, namely, 
that gives a better account of the reality of our democracies; and that we 
(2) raise the bar with regard to the individual attitudes necessary to live in 
a democracy, even when this is understood merely as co-operation among 
egoistical individuals. These two goals are connected to each other in the sense 
that the second will follow from the first.
In Rawls’ opinion, constitutional consent differs from overlapping consent 
in lacking an underlying conception of person and society. This is its weakness   
 
10  From the perspective of an economic theory of democracy, one could think of a co-operation 
reached by a majority to the detriment of a minority, as long as this minority did not rebel or 
seek open conflict. This seems in fact to be what actually happens in some countries.482   Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 9, n. 3, p. 472-495, set.-dez. 2009
for Rawls, but it is also its strength, since this aspect makes constitutional 
consent less exposed to criticism. While Rawls’ overlapping consent requires 
from individuals a far-reaching agreement not only on common goals but 
also on basic ideas and attitudes (such as, for example, a sense of justice as 
fairness), a constitutional consent requires only that the members of a political 
community agree on certain basic constitutional arrangements. However, I 
think that the latter are not limited to basic rights and to a limited use of public 
reason, as Rawls claims.
A constitution is more than a collection of individual rights and liberties. 
It includes also the basic rules of the processes of decision-taking, law-making 
and law enforcement: in other words, the rules, according to which the co-
operation game of political society is played. A constitution reflects the values 
and the beliefs of a political community, as Rawls points out; but these are 
the values and beliefs of that community in a certain historical moment (a 
constitution reflects in this sense the history of that community). With time the 
same community may alter its constitution, or even write a new one altogether. 
More likely, the community will re-interpret it according to the changing 
values and needs, and to the modified historical situation. Constitutions offer 
the basis for and draw new impulse from public debates about the meaning 
of their principles and articles. They embody the idea of political community 
as a common project. A constitution can be seen therefore as the expression 
of the intention of the members of a community to call to life a State entity. 
But it is neither stable, nor invariable – just as State entities are not (States 
may merge into a wider organism, like Italy by its reunification in 1860, or 
break off into smaller entities, like Czechoslovakia in 1993). Therefore, when 
citizens reach a common constitutional consent, they not only agree only on 
some basic rights or rules, but on the very legitimacy (1) of the State, (2) of 
its political institutions, (3) of the decision-making process as a whole, and   
(4) of the results of this process (even if they may not agree with single 
decisions: to question the rightness of a law or decree is not tantamount to 
questioning its legitimacy). 
Constitutional consent goes therefore further than Rawls assumes: it 
is the consent of players to the rules of the game. Whoever expresses this 
consent, declares her intention to respect these rules or to accept punishment 
as a consequence of their violation. When a soccer player enters the field, 
he agrees implicitly on not playing the ball with his hands, for instance, and 
he accepts the legitimacy of punishment for such a violation of the rules 
(even if he may contest the judgment of the referee in a particular situation).   
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when it is a not written one, like in the United Kingdom). Citizens of these 
States are expected to respect the constitution and therefore the legitimacy 
of State institutions and of the decisions taken within them. We can say that 
there is constitutional consent if most citizens acknowledge this expectation. 
On the contrary, if a relevant amount of citizens (it is impossible to determine 
a priori how many) do not acknowledge it, there will be both a legitimacy 
and a stability crisis, which could lead to the substitution of the current 
constitution by a new one, or eventually to the dissolution of the State   
itself.
What is to be expected from the citizens of our democratic States is 
therefore more than how economic theories of democracy think we should 
act, and less than what Rawls claims for us. As a reminder: economic theories 
expect minimal attitudes like a generic willingness to cooperate with others, 
the acknowledgement of the existence of different interests, and the necessity 
of articulating one’s own interests in a way understandable to the others; Rawls 
expects firstly “the virtue of reasonableness and a sense of fairness, a spirit of 
compromise and a readiness to meet others halfway, all of which are connected 
with the willingness to cooperate with others on political terms that everyone 
can publicly accept” (Rawls, 1993, p. 163), and secondly and most importantly, 
a consensus on basic conceptions of person and society leading to overlapping 
consent. Democratic constitutional consent as sketched above expects from 
the citizenry, in addition to the minimal attitudes stretched by economic 
theories of democracy, the acceptance of the “game rules” defined by the 
State constitution (including elements as individual rights, procedural rules, 
definitions of number, kind and composition of the State organs, determination 
of competences, and so on). While it is true, that every constitution is based 
on a certain conception of person and society (and some constitutions will try 
to fix it in a non-modifiable way, exposing themselves to a considerable risk 
of non-acceptance in future times), this does not require that the individuals 
who consent to ‘play the game’ according to the rules fixed by a constitution 
to share its underlying conceptions. On the contrary, they may question these 
very conceptions and try to modify the constitution according to changing 
values and ideals, without withdrawing their consent to the existing rules. Most 
constitutions make provisions for possible revisions or for new interpretations 
of the underlying values, (as, for example, with the concept of ‘the family’, the 
value and role of which has been much questioned in many Western societies 
in the last decades). Democratic constitutional consent is not a blind belief in 
the conceptions of person and society from which a constitution historically 
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and it does not rule out the possibility of criticizing (and of attempting to 
modify) either individual rules or the constitution as a whole. 
Constitutions are open plans for those open projects called political 
communities. The latter ones resemble the fabric of a medieval cathedral, the 
construction of which normally spans many generations, so that as the years 
go by new architects modify the original plan according to new circumstances 
or requirements. In democracies this takes place in the basis of public debates, 
the outcomes of which are normally “translated” either into new constitutional 
norms by the legislative or into a new interpretation of the existing norms by 
the judiciary. Every citizen has then the power of suggesting and discussing 
modifications – a power which should be guaranteed by the constitution 
itself. A democratic constitution makes provisions for its revision through the 
citizens (even if mostly indirectly). In this sense it “gives the State” to them, 
as Bobbio desired, and it does this on a much greater scale than he probably   
conceived. 
Is education to freedom possible?
Both republican and communitarian thinkers often claim that one of the 
main issues that the State is called to face is that of the morality of its citizens. 
In classical republicanism, for instance, it is necessary for the survival and the 
flourishing of republican institutions that citizens develop civic virtues such 
as patriotism, solidarity with fellow citizens, military courage, even some 
form of religiosity (cf. Bellah, 1975; Galston, 1991; Machiavelli, Hobbes or 
Rousseau – just to mention a few – had already considered religion as a pillar 
of a stable republic). Generally speaking, these thinkers believe that citizens 
ought to be willing to sacrifice their own interests to the common good of their 
political community; further, they hold that this willingness is not natural,11 
but must be created and preserved. Citizens become good citizens only if 
they are educated to be such. In opposition to the classical liberal position of 
Mandeville or Smith, which holds that the egoistical interests of citizens could 
unintentionally harmonize and result in common benefits for all, republicans 
and communitarians believe that private interests are highly dangerous for 
the public good and for its institutions. Citizens must therefore be taught to 
restrain themselves in their pursuit of their private goals.
11  Some of them believe that patriotism is a natural attitude, but even patriots are not necessarily 
willing to sacrifice their particular interests to the common one. They may love their country 
more than their soul (as Machiavelli once wrote), but nevertheless pursue their private goals at 
the expense of public ones, as long as they do not believe this to be too perilous for the State.485     A. Pinzani – Democratic constitutions and education to freedom
This is also the position of many liberal thinkers, beginning with Hobbes 
(whose liberalism is a continuous point of dispute) and Locke. However, what 
they do not accept is the notion that the State must assume an educational role. 
Instead, they argue that citizens would come to realize by themselves that 
self-restraint is the most rational choice, since it is to their own advantage that 
private interests do not prevail in the State. These thinkers believed therefore 
that citizens will learn to accomplish their duties toward the State once they 
have understood that strong and efficient State institutions lead to an increase 
in their own benefits, and that such institutions are possible only if every single 
individual contributes to their maintenance by sacrificing some of her private 
goals. The kind of education that liberals have in mind is therefore different 
from that sought by republicans. For liberals, the State “educates” the citizenry 
simply by working efficiently. 
Republicans would claim that this classical liberal position is circular: a 
good working State will lead its citizens to civic virtue, but in order to function 
efficiently a State must rely on the civic virtue of its citizens. However, the 
classical republican position is itself circular: the citizen’s education to virtue 
presupposes the existence of a wide, strong agreement on the values that should 
be shared by good citizens, and on those goals that constitute the common 
good. For this reason most republican theorists claim that there is no hope of 
saving a republic once the citizens no longer agree on those issues or once 
moral decadence erodes the ethical basis of society. In a sense, republican civic 
education presupposes already both the moral stability and the reliability of 
the citizenry, which is meant to be its final outcome. 
It is worth noting that the republican position is directed principally 
towards the stability of political institutions, not towards the morality of 
individuals. Civic morality is judged positively only insofar as it contributes 
to the main goal of strengthening the republic. Judith Shklar seems to be right 
in pointing out that in such cases citizens are educated less to a genuine civic 
morality than to conformism and adaptation to the currently dominating moral 
beliefs (Shklar, 1984, p. 236). This kind of “education” can be an effective 
way of safeguarding political institutions, but reveals its weakness when the 
consent of the dominating morality decreases, as is happening in our pluralistic, 
secular societies.
A further possible objection to the traditional liberal position consists in 
pointing out the low motivational force of purely functionalistic considerations. 
Claus Offe maintains, for example, that our complex societies require their 
members to operate with a certain amount of self-restraint, a denial that can 
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societies need a civic sense grounded in ethical dispositions that have the 
“quality of moral norms” (Offe, 1989, p. 759). The main difficulty with regard 
to civic morality or civic sense is not therefore so much a theoretical one (it 
would not be so difficult to show the necessity of civic virtues), as rather a 
motivational one (how are we to motivate people to develop the required 
virtues or attitudes?). Of course the two aspects are intertwined. As Robert 
Goodin observes, “sometimes getting people to do what is morally correct 
involves the more familiar task of getting them to see what is morally correct in 
first place” (Goodin, 1992, p. 4; italics mine). Nevertheless, the most difficult 
issue could be to get the people to do what they see is correct: the implication 
that someone will do the morally right thing once she or he realizes what the 
right thing is, is a strong claim concerning the mechanisms of humane action 
and, ultimately, human nature itself. While liberal theories on civic sense do 
rely on this claim, republican (and communitarian) theories prefer to rely 
on forces that are common (though external) to the members of the political 
community – forces such as tradition, solidarity, patriotism. These forces 
should motivate individuals within a political community to act in conformity 
with certain values, to take a certain attitude (a civic sense), or even to develop 
civic virtues. Thus, the ethical motivation that appears to be necessary to the 
citizens of a democracy should come from these forces and not be based on 
a rational, functional consideration of the benefits of living in an efficiently 
working State.
In explicit contrast to Rawls, Jeffrey Stout claims that 
Democracy  […]  is  a  tradition.  It  inculcates  certain  habits  of 
reasoning,  certain  attitudes  toward  deference  and  authority  in 
political discussion, and love for certain goods and virtues, as well 
as a disposition to respond to certain types of actions, events, or 
persons with admiration, pity, or horror. This tradition is anything 
but empty. Its ethical substance, however, is more a matter of 
enduring attitudes, concerns, dispositions, and patterns of conduct 
than it is a matter of agreement on a conception of justice in Rawls’s 
sense (Stout, 2004, p. 3; italics mine).
If Stout is right, then education to freedom is possible only as a forced 
(“democracy  …  inculcates  habits  etc.”)  education  to  the  values,  habits 
and attitudes of a certain tradition (in this case a democratic one). Yet, it 
seems to me that a genuine democratic tradition cannot be conceived of as 
a tradition imposing itself on individuals without taking into account their 
personal beliefs, life projects, and interests. In other words, the “habits of 
reasoning” and the dispositions that are supposed to characterize democracy 
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operate with others, the acknowledgment of the existence of different interests, 
the necessity of articulating one’s own interests in a way understandable to 
others, and the acceptance of the rules of the democratic game. In this sense, 
they are dispositions of a peculiar kind, since they admit and even promote/ 
advance moral pluralism (i. e. a plurality of values and habits), celebrate 
tolerance, and recognize that a certain amount of conflict is inherent to 
society and not undesirable since it is an expression of individual personality. 
In other words, the liberal view of democracy (both in the economic and in 
the Rawlsian version given above) relies on the idea that the flourishing of 
democratic institutions needs individuals with strong personalities and even 
with some egoistic tendencies; and it holds therefore that the main problem 
democracies face is how to reach an equilibrium between the citizens’ egoism 
and pluralism and the stability of society. Liberal theorists try to draw the line 
beyond which a society will fall apart because of the excessive individualism 
of its members and consider admissible any behavior or attitude on ‘this’ side 
of the line. Republicans and communitarians seem to believe that any form 
of individualism represents a threat to society, or at least tend to draw the line 
much earlier than liberals do.
As  for  the  “attitudes  toward  deference  and  authority  in  political 
discussion” that Stout refers to, it seems to me that Shklar is right when she 
claims that a reasonable amount of suspicion should be a characteristic trait 
of the citizens of a democracy, since “only a distrustful population can be 
relied on to watch out for its rights” (Shklar, 1984, p. 238). What characterizes 
the citizens of modern democracy (as opposed to, say, the subjects of an 
absolute monarch or to the members of a strongly traditionalistic society) is 
precisely an attitude of limited and conditional deference towards the authority 
both of their institutions and of their present government. It is a limited and 
conditional deference, since it depends on the judgment the citizens formulate 
with regard to the activity and policies of the government, on one hand, and 
on their perception of the adequacy of their institutions, on the other. If they 
come to think of a single law, of a certain institutional arrangement (e. g.: a 
procedure of law-making, an institutionalized form of political participation, 
the competences of a branch of the government, etc.), or of their constitution 
as a whole as inadequate or even illegitimate, they will withdraw their support 
for that institution. In this view, there is nothing sacred in a democracy, not 
even in the constitution, which is thus far from being a holy book. Republican 
and communitarians, however, point out the importance of viewing institutions 
as having some sacred sheen. They give an interpretation of the Platonic idea 
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principles that the republic is meant to follow. Laws (not any law, but basic 
laws such as constitutions) are the groundwork on which the State is founded 
and cannot therefore be radically discussed or questioned. From Machiavelli 
to Viroli, republicans (contrary to what they claim) entrust the survival of the 
republic to its basic laws rather than to its citizens’ morality, attitude or behavior.
In this sense, an apparent paradox which seems to characterize the position 
of republican and communitarian thinkers, is worth noticing. On the one hand, 
they make the individuals responsible for the survival and the strength of the 
State; on the other hand, they mistrust the same individuals, since they do 
not share the above mentioned implication according to which individuals 
will always do what they think is the morally right thing to do, once they see 
it, and since they prefer to rely on institutions (laws) and on forces such as 
tradition, solidarity, and patriotism. The paradox consists therefore in the fact 
that, notwithstanding their trust in these impersonal elements, republicans and 
communitarians seem to believe that the present crisis of democracy (which 
is both a legitimacy and efficiency crisis) has its primary roots in the attitude 
of the citizens. They tend to blame the individuals for the crisis and tend to 
exclude from their criticism the social, political and economic context in which 
these individuals happen to live. In this sense, there was a major shift from 
the classical republican position to the contemporary one, namely a hardly 
explicable lack of consideration for the important issue of the relation between 
political and economic power within a society. 
Those who wish a more active role and a growing participation of the 
citizens in political life should also advocate a decrease in the concentration 
of economic and political power, since such a concentration damages the 
individual’s freedom, empties out the ideal of civic sense, and threatens the 
political community itself, as classical republican authors since ever pointed 
out (and it is not important whether they were referring to Julius Cesar, to the 
Medici family, or to big companies). What really links to each other thinkers 
distant in space, time, context, and political ideas such as Cicero, Bruni, 
Machiavelli, Rousseau, Jefferson, Madison, etc. is their concerned warning 
with regard to the concentration of power in the hands of elites.
Interestingly enough, this theme has almost disappeared both from the 
political and the philosophical debate in Europe. In the past, Marxism had taken 
it over, albeit on a different basis and with different goals than republicanism. 
In the U.S., though, this topic was developed not so much by Marxist theorists 
but primarily by thinkers who saw their roots in the America of the Pilgrim 
Fathers, of the Puritan Town Councils, or of the Founding Fathers: Josiah 
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Roosevelt (all cited by a communitarian thinker, Michael Sandel, in his book 
on civic virtues; cf. Sandel, 1995, p. 59ff). Brandeis, a Supreme Court Justice, 
thought that the uncontrolled concentration of capitalistic power represented 
a threat to democracy and to the freedom of its citizens. He pointed to the 
necessity of educating citizens and to the close relation between this task and 
the question of labor. In his opinion, the education of the citizenry must be a 
continuous one, since only by such a method could they reach the knowledge 
necessary for democratic life. But this implies that the labor conditions are 
such that citizens have a guaranteed source of income and enough spare time 
to develop that “freshness of mind” necessary for their education (Strum, 
1995, p. 27f). Brandeis insists very much on this point: “The educational 
standard required of a democracy is obviously high. The citizen should be able 
to comprehend among other things the many great and difficult problems of 
industry, commerce and finance, which with us necessarily become political 
questions”. It is therefore impossible that the education of the citizenry stops 
at the age of fourteen (i. e. with the end of the common school), since the real 
democratic education starts precisely at that point (quoted in Strum 1995, 93). 
The true conditions for the democratic education of the citizenry, i. e. for a real, 
active political participation, should be sought less in the individual attitude 
of the member of a political community and rather in the political, social, and 
economical context in which they live. 
Those  contemporary  thinkers  (Pettit,  1997;  Skinner,  1998;  Viroli, 
2002) who do not consider this issue offer therefore a partial version of 
republicanism. A republican democracy can flourish only if social inequality, 
economic injustice, and political exclusion are eradicated. In this sense, if 
democracy is bound “to give the State to the citizens”, then it should also 
create the material conditions in which citizens can exercise their democratic 
power. This means that democracy cannot be understood merely as a political 
phenomenon. Democracy necessarily implies a certain democratic control 
over the economic life of a country. This is not to advocate a State controlled 
economy or the creation of a socialistic economic system; but the economic 
policies of a democratic government should obey less the allegedly “natural 
and neutral” imperatives of the market (which normally tend to favor elites) 
and be concerned rather with the needs of the people. But this is too a complex 
theme to be fully taken up in this context;12 I shall therefore leave it aside and 
move on to consider the final point: the kind of freedom that democracy is 
meant to educate the citizenry towards.
12  On the relation between political and economic power, see Pinzani (2005).490   Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 9, n. 3, p. 472-495, set.-dez. 2009
Freedom and constitution
New  republican  theorists  such  as  Philip  Pettit  or  Maurizio  Viroli 
distinguish notably between three different concepts of liberty: namely, liberal, 
democratic and republican liberty (cf. Pettit, 1997; Viroli, 2002). Inspired by 
Constant’s classical distinction between the liberty of the ancients and of the 
moderns on the one side and Berlin’s (meanwhile also classical) distinction 
between negative and positive freedom (Berlin, 1969), Pettit distinguishes 
among  three  forms  of  freedom:  negative  freedom  as  non-interference, 
positive freedom as democratic self-mastery and republican freedom as non-
domination. 
In  Pettit’s  view,  liberalism  conceives  freedom  as  non-interference, 
following a form introduced by Hobbes in Leviathan against republicans (Pettit, 
1997, p. 271). This conception justifies the existence of law: “The argument 
was that since all law is a form of interference all law reduces people’s liberty 
and no legal system […] can be dismissed as singularly inimical to freedom” 
(p. 271). According to liberals, liberty is the freedom of individuals from 
any interference in their action. When absolute freedom is either impossible 
or undesirable (as shown by the mental experiment of the state of nature) 
interference may become necessary. Every legal system implies therefore 
some sort of interference to one’s freedom, and what matters is only that 
this interference is as limited as possible (as for Locke) or as effective as 
possible (as for Hobbes). Liberalism is therefore compatible with any form 
of government, even with a despotic one. Viroli says that, on the contrary, 
no republican would call freedom that which subjects enjoy under a “liberal” 
despot who allows them graciously free to do what they want, but who could 
deprive them at any moment of their liberty at will (Viroli, 2002, p. 40), e. g. 
Hobbes’ sovereign. 
The distinction between interference and domination plays a central 
role in the distinction between liberalism and republicanism, and therefore 
is worth considering more closely. “Interference involves an intentional or 
quasi-intentional worsening of someone’s choice situation. […] Interference 
will occur on an arbitrary basis to the extent that is controlled by the arbitrium 
– the will or judgment – of the interferer: to the extent, in particular, that is 
not forced to track the interests of those who suffer the interference” (Pettit, 
1997, p. 272). Domination occurs precisely when one party has “the capacity 
to interfere on an arbitrary basis in some of the other’s choices”. Domination 
is arbitrary interference even when no actual interference occurs (as in the case 
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his subjects). The very risk of an arbitrary interference, i.e. also a potential or 
virtual arbitrary interference, allows us to speak of domination. I shall come 
back to this arbitrariness shortly.
Republicans also reject the positive conception of freedom as self-
mastery or self-government, which is a typical democratic idea. Democracy is 
defined here in a very classical sense (for example, following Plato, Rousseau 
and Kant) as the government exercised by the whole of the individuals, i.e. 
mostly by their majority, since unanimity is seldom possible. Democracy 
is therefore a form of political life in which men and not laws rule (Viroli, 
2002, p. 47). And since men rule, the law is an arbitrary one, even when it is 
choose democratically: “A law accepted voluntarily by members of the most 
democratic assembly on earth may well be an arbitrary law that permits some 
part of the society to constrain the will of other parts, thus depriving them of 
their autonomy” (Viroli, 2002, p. 43). However, the republican conception 
of  freedom  does  not  identify  it  with  self-government  but  relies  on  the 
government of laws and not of men.13 The necessary condition for the survival 
and independence of the liberty of the republic (and of its citizens) does not 
consist in the fact that the laws are created by the citizens, but rather in the fact 
that the laws promote the public good and not the interests of individuals or 
groups. The democratic process of law-making does not represent a guarantee 
in this sense, since it is quite probable that citizens in their role as law-makers 
will try to improve their personal interests at the expense of the common   
interest.
Republican freedom consists, therefore, not in the mere absence of a real 
arbitrary interference, but in the absence of any possible arbitrary interference, 
and it does not correspond to the legislative autonomy of citizens, but rather in 
the safeguarding of law’s empire. Both views seem questionable to me. First, it 
seems to me that no liberal thinker would ever defend a conception of freedom 
as a simple absence of concrete interference by the political authority or by any 
other subject (a partial exception could be represented by Hobbes because of   
 
13  Viroli  quotes  three  classical  texts  on  this  theme,  which  constitute  the  core  of  modern 
republicanism: “The first is Livy’s statement that the liberty the Romans regained after the 
expulsion of the kings consisted first and foremost, in having the laws be more powerful than 
men. The second is the speech, reported by Sallust, in which Aemilius Lepidus proclaims 
that the Roman people were free because they obeyed no one but their own laws. The third 
is the passage from Cicero’s Pro Cluentio, quoted countless times by political writers in the 
Renaissance and later: ‘All of us obey the law to the end that we may be free’” (Viroli, 2002, 
p. 48). The passages quoted by Viroli are taken from: Livy, Ab urbe condita, II.I.1; Sallust, 
Orationes et epistulae excertae de historiis, 4, Loeb Classical Library; Cicero, Pro Cluentio, 
trans. H. Grose Hodge (1927; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), IX.146 
(Viroli, 2002, p. 116).492   Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 9, n. 3, p. 472-495, set.-dez. 2009
his peculiar mechanistic view of freedom). On the contrary, liberalism arose 
from the need to guarantee to every individual an unconditional respect for her 
or his private sphere, i.e. for her or his individual liberties (even if, historically, 
this idea was often limited in its range by the very liberal authors who hold 
it, as when they then exclude women or slaves from the concept of individual 
that possesses those liberties: cf. Losurdo, 2005). No liberal thinker would ever 
accept the situation imagined by Viroli, i. e. the idea of a benevolent despot 
willing to concede liberties to his subjects, but maintaining the absolute right 
of violating those liberties. Liberal thinkers (including Hobbes) have always 
insisted on the creation of a state of juridical security according to the idea of 
due process, which became the germinal idea of the liberal Rechtsstaat, i. e. of 
a State organized according to the principle of the Rule of Law. Citizens should 
be sure that their rights are inviolable and not at the sovereign’s disposal (even 
when the sovereign is the people itself). At least on this point, republicans and 
liberals seem to build on the same concept of freedom as independence from 
domination.
However, a real difference does appear to exist between the republican and 
the democratic, or rather the radical democratic, concept of freedom. According 
to the view of (radical) democracy exposed by the New Republicans, popular 
sovereignty is unlimited and stops before nothing, not even individual liberties. 
In a (radical) democracy, we would face the above mentioned situation in which 
individual rights were dependent on the sovereign’s arbitrary will. This may be 
true for radical democracy, but it is not true of our contemporary democracies, 
which are rather the result of a combination of the above mentioned traditions, 
i.e. liberal, republican and radical democratic. In same cases, notably with 
the Welfare State, one can even speak of the influence of a further tradition, 
socialist, which introduced the idea of social rights (whose legal status as 
compared to other basic rights is still the object of dispute). In this sense, 
one could claim that our contemporary democracies are the expression of a 
peculiar mixture of traditions. This mixture has a name: constitutionalism, 
which represents itself as an autonomous tradition traceable back to Plato and 
his theory of the mixed constitution.
If we were to attribute to each of these traditions a basic principle, we could 
say that: (1) republicanism consists in the double idea that political autonomy 
is the highest good, and that it can be reached only in the context of republican 
institutions; (2) liberalism consists in the idea that all individuals are politically 
and legally equal, and that this equality is inviolable; (3) radical democracy 
claims that only those institutions and norms that are the expression of the 
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states that legitimacy can be claimed only by those institutions and legal orders 
that are organized according to constitutional norms (be they written or not), 
which are not at the sovereign will’s disposal – except in situations in which 
the sovereign decides to change, reform or abolish the present constitution. 
Nevertheless, in such cases, the process of constitutional revision is complex 
and regulated by rigid rules that are established by the very constitution that is to 
be revised. Mixing together elements of the other traditions, constitutionalism 
offers therefore a view according to which: (1) individuals have inalienable 
rights protecting them from the arbitrary will of others, including the State 
(this is a classical liberal claim), (2) all individuals are at the same time authors 
and addressees of the laws (as the radical democratic tradition would have 
it), and finally (3) valid norms are only those which result from a rigorous 
process, whose rules are to be strictly observed and cannot be lightly modified 
(according to the republican idea of law’s empire being superior even to the 
principle of popular sovereignty). For this reason, constitutionalism shares 
with liberalism a certain suspicion towards State power and consequently 
a great attention to its possible abuses; with radical democracy, the idea of 
an unlimited participation of citizens in political life and in the legislative 
process; and with republicanism, a certain distrust against the multitude and 
the possible abuse of legislative power by individuals, by a majority, or even 
by the people as a whole. 
Returning now to Bobbio’s initial claim, according to which citizens 
will be educated to freedom only through a democratic constitution, in the 
context of the above considerations of freedom and constitutionalism. What 
Bobbio appears to suggest is that a democratic constitution is more likely to 
educate citizens to exercise precisely that kind of freedom which is necessary 
in order to maintain the constitution itself and which consists essentially in 
accepting and respecting the basic rules of the ‘democratic game’. It does not 
educate them towards being civically virtuous, nor to establishing ‘strong’ 
forms of liberty (such as the positive liberty identified by Isaiah Berlin). In this 
sense, a democratic constitution does not enhance the morality of its citizens 
(as Kant desired), but reinforces itself against Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde’s 
pessimistic diagnosis that the secularized democratic state lives on ideological 
bases which it cannot reproduce itself (Böckenförde, 1991, p. 112). However, 
our democratic societies do in fact face a motivational crisis that is at the 
same time an ideological one. Yet, whether this has to do with the loss of 
public morality, civic virtues etc., or rather (as I suspect) with the fact that 
constitutions are less and less respected by the very institutions created by 
them, is a question that cannot be answered here.494   Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 9, n. 3, p. 472-495, set.-dez. 2009
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